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LIFE INSURANCE AS AN ASSET AVAILABLE
TO CREDITORS IN MARYLAND
By BRIDGEWATER M. ANOLD*
In this article concerning the proceeds of insurance
policies as an asset available to creditors, proceeds from
property-protecting policies such as marine, fire, theft and
the like, are excluded from consideration. Also, it is not
the purpose to consider problems arising out of cases where
a creditor is the named beneficiary or assignee.' It is the
matter of the proceeds payable from life insurance policies
where a creditor is not named beneficiary or assignee that
will be considered.
As an original proposition it is accepted that, under
appropriate circumstances, proceeds from insurance poli-
cies are just as much an asset available to creditors as
any other property of a debtor, such as real property or
chattels.
Professor Glenn, in his book "Creditors' Rights and
Remedies"2 states:
"A policy of life insurance in effect represents ac-
cumulated payments by the insured which, if he dies
within a limited period, result in a payment to his
estate or the beneficiary under the policy, but if he
lives beyond a certain period, result in his being en-
titled to receive from the insurer certain cash, in addi-
tion to having his insurance continued, or, in some
instances, in substitution of the latter right. When
this stage has been reached the policy is said to have
* A.B., 1923, Princeton University; LL.B., 1931, University of Maryland.
Professor of Law (on leave), University of Maryland School of Law;
Price Attorney for Maryland, Office of Price Administration.I As exemplified in Fitzgerald v. Rawlings, 114 Md. 470, 79 A. 915 (1911).
2 GLENN, THE RIGHTS AND RmFzmEmS op C rTORS RESPECTING THEIR
PRoPEaTy (1915) 40.
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a cash surrender value. As has been said, this cash
surrender value is composed of 'the excess in the
premiums paid over the annual cost of insurance, with
accumulations of interest'. '3  As the Supreme Court
has noted, nearly every insurance policy of the present
day 'will be found to have either a stipulated sur-
render value or an established value, the amount of
which the companies are willing to pay'.4 When a
policy reaches this stage, it bears out the remark of
Vice Chancellor Pitney that 'there is no mystery or
charm about life insurance. It is not the means of
creating wealth, nor yet a contract of mere indemnity,
as is that of fire and marine insurance. It is in its
most usual form, simply a mode of putting by money
for savings.'5 Apart from the question of fraudulent
transfer, in connection with laying by such treasures
for the benefit of another by means of a policy of
life insurance, there is no doubt that unless restrained
by statute this cash surrender value is an asset avail-
able to creditors".6
Without laboring this point further, it may be added
that under the Bankruptcy Act7 insurance policies may
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy if the insurance is not
exempt under Federal or State law." Decisions of Federal
courts, including the District Court for Maryland,9 have
likewise established this.
However, not all proceeds from policies in which the
debtor is the insured are available to his creditors. Thus,
where a policy is payable to a beneficiary, other than the
insured, and no power is reserved to the insured to divest
the interest of the beneficiary by changing the beneficiary,
3 Citing In re M'Kenny, 15 F. 535 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1883).
'Citing Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 (1913).
Citing Merchants Co. v. Bosland, 53 N. J. Eq. 282, 31 A. 272 (1895).
See also, VANcE INSURANCE (2nd Ed. 1930) 614.
7 Sec. 70A; 11 U. S. C. A. 110A. "... That when any bankrupt, who is
a natural person, shall have any insurance policy which has a cash sur-
render value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representative, he
may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascer-
tained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or
secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to
hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors
participating in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets. .. .
e Ibid, Sec. 6.
In re Jones, 249 F. 487 (1917).
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it is the absolute property of the beneficiary and, in the
absence of statute to the contrary or fraud, it cannot be
reached by the insured debtor's creditors. 10
If, however, such a policy is taken out or the premiums
on such a policy are paid by the insured in fraud of cred-
itors, or when he is insolvent, some jurisdictions permit
creditors to pursue the proceeds to a greater or lesser
degree, the result often being regulated by statutes cover-
ing this situation in the particular state. In the absence
of statutes, some states permit creditors to recover the
entire proceeds; other states allow the creditors so much
of the fund as represents premiums paid while insolvent
plus interest; still other states hold that even an insolvent
may devote a reasonable part of his money for the pro-
tection of his family and, in the absence of actual fraud,
protect the fund for the beneficiaries without even allow-
ing creditors to recover the value of the premiums paid."
Also, generally, in the absence of statutory protection,
the assignment, while insolvent, of the insured's interest
in a policy to a third person without a fair consideration
is a fraudulent conveyance. 2
Maryland, by virtue of statutes, has permitted a hus-
band to take out life insurance for the benefit of his wife
or to assign such policy to his wife so that it shall be free
from the claims of his creditors;1s and, even more liberally,
has permitted any person to take out life insurance on his
own life or bona fide to assign such a policy, for the benefit
20 VANCE, INSURANCE (2nd Ed. 1930) 616, 617; CooLEY, BRIEs ON INSUR-
ANCE (2d Ed. 1928) 6494.
"I VANCE, INSURANCE (2nd Ed. 1930) 621-626; Note, Rights of Creditors
of an Insured Insolvent Against His Wife and Children as Beneficiaries of
a Life Policy (1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 771.
21 VANCE, INSURANCE (2nd Ed. 1930) 617; GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCES AND PREFERENCES (1940) Sec. 177.
11 Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 8: "Any married woman by herself
and in her name or in the name of any third person with his assent as
her trustee may insure or cause to be insured for her sole use the life
of her husband for any definite period or for the term of his natural life;
and any husband may cause his own life to be insured for the sole use of
his wife and may also assign any policy of insurance upon his own life
to his wife for her sole use; and in case of the wife surviving her husband,
the sum or net amount of such insurance becoming due and payable by the
terms of the insurance shall be payable to her for her own use, free from
the claims of the representatives of her husband, or any of his creditors."
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of wife, children, or any relative or creditor free from all
claims of the creditors of such insured person."
These statutes have been before the Court of Appeals
in relatively few cases. This paucity of decisions is per-
haps due to the sweeping construction given these statutes
by the Court.
In Elliott v. Bryan,5 a husband, utterly insolvent, as-
signed to his wife a policy that was payable to himself or
his personal representatives and assigns. After the death
of the husband a creditor sought to reach the proceeds
by a bill in Equity on the theory that the assignment was
in fraud of creditors. In its opinion, speaking of Article
45, Section 4, the Maryland Court of Appeals said:
"This statute is one of a series of enactments in
furtherance of the policy of protecting married women.
It enables a husband to provide a fund for the benefit
of his wife, in which his creditors have no interest or
concern. It is nothing to the purpose that the cred-
itors may be unable to obtain payment of their claims
out of the husband's property. This was the very
exigency which the statute was intended to meet; this
was the occasion when the wife needed protection.
It would have been unnecessary to exempt the pro-
ceeds of the insurance from the claims of creditors,
in cases where the husband's property was sufficient
to pay them. It was contemplated, that in cases where
the creditors could not otherwise obtain payment, they
would resort to this settlement on the wife; and at
this point the statute interposes and secures it to her.
There is no restriction, qualification or proviso in the
Act of Assembly, and it would be against common
reason to except from its operation the cases of hus-
bands who were unable to pay their debts."
In this case the statement of facts as alleged indicates
that at the time of the assignment the policy had a realiz-
able value of several thousand dollars.
"Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 9: "All policies of life insurance upon
the life of any person which may hereafter mature, and which have been
or shall be taken out for the benefit of or bona fide assigned to the wife
or children or any relative dependent upon such person or any creditor
shall be vested in such wife or children or other relative or creditor, free
and clear from all claims of the creditors of such insured person."
" 64 Md. 368, 1 A. 614 (1885).
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Two months after deciding Elliott v. Bryan, the Court
of Appeals, in Earnshaw, Ex'r. et al. v. Stewart,16 again
had the opportunity to pass on the validity of an assign-
ment of an insurance policy which was under attack by a
creditor, where the debtor had assigned the policy to his
four sons. In this case Article 45, Section 9, and particu-
larly the words "bona fide", as used in the statute, received
the Court's attention. The facts of the transaction, such
as they are, are set forth in the following paragraph of
the Court's opinion dealing with the insurance phase of
the litigation:
"This is a bill to set aside an assignment of a life
policy, made by a father to his four sons; also to set
aside a bill of sale made to his son, William, as being
in fraud of the rights of his creditors. So far as con-
cerns the life policy, it is sufficient to say, that the as-
signment is, under the Act of 1878, chapter 200,17 a
valid assignment. This the Act declares in express
terms. It may not be easy to understand what the
Legislature meant by 'bona fide' as here used, unless
they meant there must be an out and out assignment
to the wife or children, and not one upon some secret
trust in favor of the assignor; or it may be they meant
it to apply to assignments of life policies to creditors,
which the same section of the Act authorized the in-
sured to make. But be that as it may, it is clear, we
think, that construing the Acts of 1862, Chapter 9,18
and 1878, Chapter 200,19 together, the Legislature
meant to confer upon the insured the right to make
a voluntary assignment of a life policy to his wife or
children, free and clear says the Act, 'from all claims
of the creditors of such insured persons.' Elliott v.
Bryan, ante page 368."
It is interesting to note in the Earnshaw case that a
transfer of personal property by the vehicle of a bill of
sale at about the same time that the insurance was assigned
was held by the court to be a fraudulent conveyance sub-
ject to successful attack by the creditor, although the vol-
18 64 Md. 513, 2 A. 734 (1886).
17 Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 9, quoted 8upra, n. 14.
" Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 8, quoted supra, n. 13.
19 Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 9, quoted 8upra, n. 14.
1942]
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untary assignment of the insurance policy, just a few days
before the bill of sale was executed, was protected by the
Court by virtue of Article 45, Section 9. In neither the
Elliott case nor the Earnshaw case was there any dissent-
ing opinion.
Stress is laid on these two decisions for two reasons,
first, because they are the only two decisions of the Court
of Appeals construing Article 45, Sections 8 and 9, with
the exception of one other case, Pratt v. Hill" which, while
mentioning Article 45, Sections 8 and 9, decided nothing
regarding the insurance proceeds because of the incom-
*pleteness of the record, which did not set forth the terms
of the insurance policy; secondly, because both the Elliott
case and the Earnshaw case show the practically out and
out immunity from attack by creditors which the Court
of Appeals gave to the assignment of insurance policies
under the conditions set forth in Article 45, Sections 8 and
9. It definitely put Maryland in the category of states
which permit a person, even though highly insolvent, by
the vehicle of insurance to protect those who have a claim
to his bounty free from the claims of creditors. The only
indicated limitation on the protection of such an assign-
ment from creditors was in the event the assignment was
not in good faith as between the assignor and the assignee.
An important point to be considered in connection with
Article 45, Sections 8 and 9, is whether or not the enact-
ment of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 2 in 1920
has not to a large extent, if not entirely, where insolvency
is involved, destroyed the effectiveness of Article 45, Sec-
tions 8 and 9. It would seem, unless they are protected by
exemption statutes, that the assignments of policies by
insolvent debtors in both the case of Elliott v. Bryan, and
Earnshaw v. Stewart, clearly would be fraudulent convey-
ances within the provisions of the Uniform Act which, in
Section 4, provides:
"Every conveyance made and every obligation in-
curred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered
2o 124 Md. 252, 92 A. 543 (1914).
21 Md. Code (1939) Art. 39B.
[VOL. VI
INSURANCE AS AN ASSET
insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard
to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the
obligation is incurred without a fair consideration."22
"'Conveyance' includes every payment of money,
assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge
of tangible or intangible property, and also the crea-
tion of any lien or incumbrance." 23
"Fair consideration is given for property, or obli-
gation, (a) When in exchange for such property, or
obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good
faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is
satisfied * * *"24
Applying these definitions to Section 4 above, it can be
said that every assignment made by a person who is in-
solvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his
actual intent if the assignment is made without a fair con-
sideration. In both the Elliott and the Earnshaw cases
there was an assignment of the insurance policies by a per-
son who was insolvent without a fair consideration.
. It would seem quite certain that the assignments made
in those cases, if made today, could be successfully at-
tacked by creditors unless Article 45, Sections 8 and 9,
or some other exemption statute such as Article 83, Section
8 could preserve them. But Article 39B, Section 14, pro-
vides:
"All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with this Act
are hereby repealed. But nothing herein shall be con-
strued to repeal any part of the existing insolvent law
of this State as contained in Article 47 of the Code
of Public General Laws of Maryland (Bagby's Code)
so far as said insolvent law is not superseded by the
Federal Bankrupt Law; nor the law relating to fraud-
ulent conveyances from husband to wife as contained
in Article 45, Sections 1, 2 and 11 of said Code; nor
the provisions of Article 16, Section 48 of said Code
relating to the method of establishing the creditor's
claim; nor the provisions of the Act of 1912, Chapter
451 and of the Act of 1916, Chapter 371, relating to
sales in bulk."
2 Md. Code (1939) Art. 39B, Sec. 4.
2: Md. Code (1939) Art. 39B, Sec. 1. Italics supplied.
"Md. Code (1939) Art. 39B, Sec. 3.
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If the assignment is made by the insured to his wife
she apparently would be protected from any attack on the
assignment by any creditors of the husband subsisting at
the time of the assignment, unless these creditors a~sert
their rights within three years thereof, and from attack
of all creditors subsequent to the assignment, because of
the provisions of Article 45, Section 1.25
It will be noticed that Article 39B, Section 14 does not
preserve Sections 8 and 9 of Article 45, although it does
specifically preserve Sections 1, 2, and 11 of that Article.
If this assignment can be attacked by creditors as fraud-
ulent under the state law then in the event that the as-
signor goes into bankruptcy, the policy, unless exempted
by state or Federal Statute, would vest in the trustee by
virtue of the Bankruptcy Act which provides that "prop-
erty transferred by him in fraud of his creditors" vests in
the trustee.26  Also, the policy probably could be reached
by the trustee under Section 70e and Section 67 of the
Bankruptcy Act.27
As a result, then, of the enactment of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the only protection that Mary-
land debtors, harassed by their creditors, have in order
to preserve their insurance for the benefit of their families
must be found in procedural obstacles confronting cred-
" Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 1: "The property, real and personal,
belonging to a woman at the time of her marriage, and all the property
which she may acquire or receive after her marriage, by purchase, gift,
grant, devise, bequest, descent, in the course of distribution, by her own
skill, labor or personal exertions, or in any other manner, shall be pro-
tected from the debts of the husband, and not in any way be liable for the
payment thereof; provided, that no acquisition of property passing from
one spouse to the other, shall be valid if the same has been made or
granted in prejudice of the rights of subsisting creditors, who, however,
must assert their claims within three years after the acquisition of the
property, or be absolutely barred, and, for the purpose of asserting their
rights under this section, claims of creditors not yet due and matured shall
be considered as due and matured."
"Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 70A(4); 11 U. S. C. A. 11OA(4).
2 Md. Code (1939) Art. 48A, Sec. 114 enables a married woman to insure
the life of her husband for the wife's sole use and protects any insurance
payable from the claims of the husband's creditors. If the premiums are
paid with the wife's money there would appear to be no question of any
fraud on the husband's creditors. If, however, this statute should be con-
strued so broadly as to cover such insurance even though the husband paid
the premiums interesting problems would arise.
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itors in their pursuit of this asset, or in some other ex-
emption statutes of the state. The latter statutes will be
considered subsequently.
Let us for the time being consider this problem of the
proceeds from insurance as an asset available for creditors,
in the situation where the debtor has not divested himself
of all right to the proceeds, fraudulently or not, but is the
holder of a policy on his own life, with either himself, his
estate or some third person named as beneficiary and with
the privilege on the part of the insured to change the bene-
ficiary. There appear to be no decisions of the Maryland
Court of Appeals on this question. The law generally
appears to be that if there is no presently realizable value
in such a policy, i. e., that the insurance company has no
obligation to pay anything until the happening of a con-
dition such as death, then until the happening of that
condition there is nothing available for the insured's cred-
itors. This would seem to fall under the general principle
that in the absence of fraud a creditor has no greater
rights against a third person than the debtor has against
said third person, that a creditor can only take that which
his debtor has or to which he is entitled. Professor Vance
states:
"It may be said, that as a general rule, the policy
is not to be regarded as liable to seizure under any
form of judicial process against the insured so long
as the duty of the insurer to pay is subject to any
contingency, or to any condition precedent. Such a
condition may be under the control of the insurer, as
where the policy gives the insurer the power to elect
between several optional forms of the settlement; or
where it permits the insured to fix the duty of the
insurer by electing to receive cash, or a paid-up policy,
or some other optional benefit. Until such option is
exercised in favor of a cash payment, the insurer can-
not be said to be so indebted to the insured as to be
subject to garnishment. But where the policy is taken
out by the insured for his own benefit and the only
condition to the insurer's promise to pay an agreed
surrender value is the insured's giving up the policy
for cancellation, the courts generally permit the at-
1942]
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taching creditor to deliver up the policy and receive
the surrender value. 28
As a general proposition, aside from proceedings in
bankruptcy, where under the terms of the policy the
debtor-insured has named a third person as beneficiary,
but reserves the right to change the beneficiary, creditors
cannot subject the interest of the insured to the satisfac-
tion of their judgments either before or after the death of
the insured.29.
Assuming that the provisions and conditions of the
policy are such that a creditor of the insured could subject
them to the satisfaction of his claim or judgment ° and
no exemption statutes interfere, what procedure could a
creditor use?
In approaching this question it would seem important
first to note that an insurance policy is a chose in action.3 1
A chose in action cannot, at common law, be reached in
execution by a fieri facias. Chancellor Bland said: 32
"At the time when the principles of the common
law in relation to the distinction between real and
personal property became established, but a small pro-
portion of the community seems to have been of that
incorporeal kind which is now so very large in amount
and so productive. Hence, in the spirit of the sim-
plicity of the common law, it was deemed safest and
best to confine the power of the creditor over the prop-
erty of his debtor to that alone which was visible,
tangible and capable of being distinctly valued, sold
and transferred, as affording an ample scope for the
creditor to obtain the satisfaction to which he was en-
titled.
VANCE, INSURANCE (2nd Ed. 1930) 614.
'o See VANCE, INSURANCE (2nd Ed. 1930) 563, 564. In this connection it
is interesting to note that If the policy reserves to the insured the right to
change the beneficiary with the assent of the insurer, the beneficiary first
designated does not take a vested interest. COOLEY, BRiEFs ON INSURANCE(2nd Ed. 1928) 6406; Rosman v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, 127 Md.
689, 96 A. 875 (1916). See also Bullen v. Safe Deposit and Trust Com-
pany, 177 Md. 271, 9 A. (2d) 581 (1939).
30 See the quotation from Professor Vance, supra, n. 28.
Rittler v. Smith, 70 Md. 261, 16 A. 890 (1889) where it was said: "It
is settled law In this state that a life insurance policy is but a chose in
action for the payment of money and may be assigned as such. Insurance
Company v. Flack, 3 Md. 341; Whitridge v. Barry, 42 Md. 150."
32 Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland 284, 314 (1831).
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"Upon these principles the writ of fieri facias was
framed, and in concise and general terms expressed
the nature and extent of the sheriff's power and duty.
The language of the execution imports, that the goods
and chattels, which are the subject of it, are property
of a tangible nature, capable of manual seizure, and
of being detained in the sheriff's custody, and such
as are conveniently capable of sale and transfer by
the sheriff, to whom the writ is directed, for the satis-
faction of a creditor."
And, as recently as 1933, 33 the Court of Appeals held
that a widow's right of dower in land, before the same had
been assigned and set off, could not be taken in execution
because it was a mere chose in action.
In other words, in the absence of statutory provisions,
a creditor cannot execute on a chose in action. One can-
not fl. fa. an intangible. And by execution, as the writer
hopes to establish later, is meant seizure and sale under a
writ of fieri facias 4
Execution being eliminated as a method of procedure,
it remains to consider briefly what other remedies a cred-
itor could pursue to reach the value of the policy in the
hands of the insurance company. The possibilities which
occur to the writer are: A creditor's bill in equity, sup-
plementary proceedings, attachment on original process,
attachment on judgment, and bankruptcy.
Creditor's Bill: While creditor's bill might be available
in some jurisdictions3 5 it seems highly doubtful that it
could be used in Maryland. In Harper v. Clayton,3 6 the
Court held that a widow's right to dower in the lands of
her deceased husband, before the same has been assigned
and set off to her, is a mere chose in action, cannot be
taken in execution at law, and that equity, apart from
statutory authority and in the absence of fraud or some
a Harford Bank v. Banking & Trust Co., 165 Md. 454, 169 A. 315 (1933).
M, d. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 85. In this connection it may be noted
that the Legislature has specially provided by statute that the interest
which a debtor may have on the books in the capital stock of a corporation
"shall be liable to execution or attachment".
"Stephens v. Cady, 55 U. S. 528 (1852); Ager v. Munay, 105 U1. S. 121
(1881).
84 Md. 346, 35 A. 1083 (1896).
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element of trust, has no jurisdiction to subject the choses
in action of a debtor to the payment of creditors, merely
because the creditors have no remedy at law. The Court
quoted with approval from an Indiana case:"
"Equity will not subject choses in action to the
payment of a judgment creditor, because equity only
aids the law, and will, therefore, not interfere, except
as to such property as may be sold on execution at
law."
Harper v. Clayton, and the above quotation were ap-
proved in Harford Bank v. Banking & Trust Co. s
Supplementary Proceedings: The statute3 9 provides
that under the conditions set forth a creditor can reach
the "property or credits which would be liable to said
attachment or execution". This would seem to indicate
that whether or not the value of the policy can be reached
in these proceedings depends on whether or not they can
be made subject to attachment-execution being elimin-
ated.
Attachment on Original Process: The statute 0 says:
"Any kind of property or credits belonging to the
defendant, in the plaintiff's own hands, or in the hands
of any one else, may be attached; and credits may
be attached which shall not then be due."
This language may be broad enough to afford a creditor
this remedy if the other requisites for laying the attach-
ment exist. There appear to be no decisions on the point.41
While not determined as yet, this remedy is probably avail-
able.
8 Williams v. Reynolds, 7 Ind. 622 (1856).
38 165 Md. 454, 169 A. 315 (1933).
89 Md. Code (1939) Art. 75, Sec. 147.
'
0 Md. Code (1939) Art. 9, Sec. 10.
'1 In Stone v. Mutual etc. Co., 74 Md. 579, 22 A. 1051 (1891) the Court of
Appeals held that where there is a loss under a fire insurance policy which
provided that the insurance company might either pay the insured a stipu-
lated amount or else rebuild, and the company elected to rebuild, a creditor
of the insured could not successfully lay an attachment in the hands of
the company. In this case, it must be remembered, it was fire and not life
insurance involved. Also, the election was the choice of the insurer and
not the insured. Also the insurer had already signed a contract with a
builder before the attachment was laid in the company's hands.
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Attachment on Judgment: The Code42 provides in part:
"Any plaintiff having a judgment or decree in any
court of law or equity in this State may, instead of
any other execution, issue an attachment against the
lands, tenements, goods, chattels and credits of the
defendant in the plaintiff's own hands, or in the hands
of any other person. * * *"
Here again there appears to be no decision of the Court
of Appeals for guidance, and one can only speculate as to
whether or not this procedure could be used. The language
may be broad enough to make this remedy available.
Bankruptcy: If the debtor is adjudged bankrupt, the
insurance policy or its cash surrender value may pass to
the trustee in bankruptcy under the provisions of the
National Bankruptcy Act.4"
In bankruptcy proceedings in the District Court for
Maryland, the Court has had to pass on what, if any, pro-
ceeds from life insurance policies, the bankrupt could
exempt and what, if any, passed to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy under Sections 6 and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act.
The results reached have turned on the problem of con-
struing Article 83, Section 8 (the Maryland exemption
statute) and Article 3, Section 44 of the Maryland Consti-
tution. The first, and to the writer the most important
case is In re Jones.44
In this case the bankrupt held a policy of life insurance
on his life in which his wife was named beneficiary, but
the bankrupt had the power at any time to change the bene-
ficiary without the wife's consent. At the time of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy the policy had a cash sur-
render value of $1,725.85. The trustee in bankruptcy
claimed that he was entitled to the policy or its surrender
value. The bankrupt and his wife denied the trustee's
claim.
The District Court for Maryland (Judge Rose) took
the view that inasmuch as the insured up to the time of
12 Md. Code (1939) Art. 9, Sec. 29.
4 Sec. 70A; 11 U. S. C. A. 110A.
"1 249 F. 487 (D. C. D. Md., 1917).
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the filing of the petition had not exercised his right to
change the beneficiary, the policy had no cash surrender
value payable to the bankrupt, his estate or personal rep-
resentative, and, as a consequence, it did not pass to the
trustee. This result would be in harmony with the general
view followed by state courts and referred to above, that
an insured's interest in such a policy could not be reached
by his creditors.
Three days after this opinion was handed down, but
before any order had been entered, the United States Su-
preme Court decided the case of Cohen v. Samuels,45 in
which it ruled that where the bankrupt held life insurance
policies, naming certain relatives beneficiaries but reserv-
ing the absolute right to change the beneficiaries without
the latter's consent, under the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act46 vesting the trustee with powers which the bankrupt
might have exercised for his own benefit, the trustee could
exercise this power and the cash surrender value must
pass to the trustee.
As a result of this decision Judge Rose rendered a sup-
plemental opinion in the Jones case holding that the policy,
unless exempt by state statute, passed to the trustee in
bankruptcy. In the course of this supplemental opinion
he said:
"Does the Maryland law exempt such policies? As
was pointed out in the previous opinion, they are not
exempt by virtue of Sections 8 and 9 of Article 45 of
the Maryland Code, unless they are for the benefit of
the wife, and the Supreme Court has ruled that they
are not. Are they made immune by Section 8 of Ar-
ticle 83, which purports to exempt all money payable
in the nature of insurance, benefit, or relief, in the
contingency or event of sickness, accident, hurt, or
death of any person, from execution or seizure in
satisfaction of debt or a claim upon judgment in any
civil proceeding? This language is plain enough. No-
body would raise any question as to what it means,
if it were not that Section 44 of Article 3 of the State
Constitution limits the power of the Legislature to
'5245 U. S. 50 (1917).
4 6 Sec. 70A(3) ; 11 U. S. C. A. 110A(3).
[VOL. VI
INSURANCE AS AN ASSET
grant exemptions from execution of property not
exceeding in value $500. In view of this limitation, it
has been argued that the legislative intent must have
been different from that which its words naturally
import. This contention is not persuasive, nor may it
be assumed that the General Assembly was either
ignorant of the constitutional prohibition or indifferent
to it. Whatever may or may not be true as to indi-
vidual members, the court must assume that the Gen-
eral Assembly knew the constitution and sought to
obey it. Nothing said or decided in Himmel v. Eichen-
green, 107 Md. 612, 69 Atl. 511, or Dale v. Brumbly,
96 Md. 674, 54 Atl. 655, justifies the assumption that
the power of the Legislature to exempt from execution
can be exercised without limit as to value. In these
cases it was held that what is now Section 236 of Arti-
cle 23, which is the corporation law of the state, consti-
tutionally exempts from liability to attachment all
moneys, irrespective of the amount, payable under a
certificate issued by a fraternal beneficial association.
The decision was based upon two grounds: (1) That
attachment is not execution. (2) That the association
in whose hands it was sought to attach the money
would have no power under the laws of the state to
pay any of that money to a creditor of one of its mem-
bers. Neither of these reasons here applies. The re-
striction imposed by Section 44 of Article 3 of the Con-
stitution must, until the Court of Appeals otherwise
rules, be held binding; but, if so, it is unnecessary for
the Legislature to say anything about it. It will of
its own force be read into every act dealing with the
subject."
The Court then ruled that the bankrupt was entitled
to exempt $500 from the cash surrender value.41
7 In the last paragraph of the Supplemental Opinion in this case (In re
Jones, 249 F. 487, 491) the Court said: "The bankrupt has claimed an
exemption of $100 out of the general assets of his estate. He has not
received it. He will be entitled, upon payment to the trustee in bankruptcy
of $1,225.85, which is $500 less than the surrender value of the policy, to
hold free of all claims of the trustee, but in -full satisfaction of all exemp-
tions to which, under section 8 of article 83 he is entitled." While it is not
stated why the claim for the $100 exemption out of general assets was
refused, the language above quoted would seem to warrant the conclusion
that the court was of the opinion that the debtor would not be entitled to
more than a total of $500 from all types of exemptions. In other words,
if the debtor had been allowed a $100 property exemption he would only
be allowed a $400 insurance exemption. Another example might contem-
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It should be added that Judge Rose in reaching his
result also referred to an interpretation given to Article
83, Section 8, by Judge Wickes in Circuit Court No. 2 of
Baltimore City in an unreported case some ten years
earlier. The following is probably the litigation to which
reference was made.
In Nicholson v. Nicholson,48 various claimants, including
creditors of the deceased insured, filed a bill to have the
Court determine their rights to portions of the estate,
practically the whole of which consisted of the proceeds
of an insurance policy made payable to his personal repre-
sentatives and which had been collected by the personal
representative. The Court exempted $500 saying:
"Nor does this Court deem that the order passed
on the fourth day of June, 1907, by his Hon. Judge
Wickes sitting herein, the practical effect of which
order was to exempt from execution $500 of the pro-
ceeds of said policy, settles the issues above named.
"Giving full effect to the action of his Honor, Judge
Wickes, the question still remains as to what disposi-
tion is to be made of the proceeds of said insurance
policy over and above the sum of $500 decided to be
exempted in accordance with Ch. 381, of the Acts of
1904.
"Addressing the Court's attention to the various
claims set up I am unable to discover any good reason
to hold that the proceeds of the insurance policy are
to be exempted to any greater extent than the sum
of $500 from the claims of the creditors of Edwin C.
Nicholson, and I do not consider it necessary to refer
to any decision or statute law other than those already
mentioned. 49
plate a situation where the debtor had a policy with only a cash surrender
value of $300, wearing apparel worth $150 and other general assets worth
more than $500. If the cash surrender value is exempted and $100 from
general assets under Art. 83, Sec. 8 making a total of $400, then the debtor,
under this decision could only exempt $100 worth of his wearing apparel,
not all of it as provided in Art. 83, Sec. 11 which provides: "All wearing
apparel . . . shall be exempt from execution, in addition to the property
hereinbefore exempted .... "
482 Baltimore City Rep. 564 (1908), Elliott, J.
'o For recent U. S. Supreme Court cases on the question of Federal
courts following state court decisions see Vandenback v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538 (1941), note 21 of which says: "We have applied
the rule enumerated in the case of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S. Ct. 816,
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Before taking up the other decisions in bankruptcy, it
might be well to consider whether or not it may be possible
that the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City and the
Bankruptcy Court assumed too much in ruling that the
provision in Article 83, Section 8, exempting all money
payable in the nature of insurance from creditors was
restricted by the Constitutional limitation.
The Maryland Constitution, Art. 3, Sec. 44, provides:
"Laws shall be passed by the General Assembly
to protect from execution a reasonable amount of the
property of the debtor, not exceeding in value the sum
of five hundred dollars." (Italics supplied.)
Such a provision did not appear in the Constitution of
1776 but was incorporated into the Constitutions of 185150
and 1864,1 and, of course, is in the present Constitution of
1867.
In 1861 the Legislature, at a special session held in
Frederick, enacted the following statute:52
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Mary-
land, that one hundred dollars worth of property of
each defendant therein shall be exempt from execution
that state law as determined by the state's highest court is to be followed
as a rule of decision in the Federal Courts, to determinations by state
intermediate appellate courts. . . ." This note cites West v. American T.
& T. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940) (intermediate court) ; Fidelity Union T. Co.
v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940) (Court of Chancery, which seems to have
original jurisdiction, but is treated as on a parity with the Supreme Court,
both of which are below the Court of Errors and Appeals, and the language
in the Supreme Court opinion appears to treat it as an intermediate court) ;
Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District, 311 U. S. 180 (1940)(intermediate court) ; and Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464
(1940) (intermediate court).
While all these decisions seem to be treated as decisions of courts of
intermediate appellate jurisdiction it is possible that the language in the
cases, particularly Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field (involving the New
Jersey Court of Chancery) may be broad enough to hold that Federal
Courts are bound by the decisions of State Courts of original jurisdiction,
In the absence of higher authority. If this is true, then it may be that the
Federal Court considers itself bound by Judge Elliott's ruling in Circuit
Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. If the Supreme Court decisions, on the
other hand, do not go as far as suggested, then the Federal Court would
not necessarily be bound by Judge Elliott's ruling.
10 Art. 3, See. 39.
11 Art. 3, See. 43.
"Md. Laws 1861, Ch. 7, See. 1.
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issued on any judgment in any civil proceeding what-
ever, except on judgments for breach of promise to
marry or for seduction."
In 1904 the Legislature amended this statute" to include
the provision exempting insurance. It provides as follows:
"One hundred dollars in property, whether the
same consists of money, land or goods, of every de-
fendant, as well as all money payable in the nature of
insurance, benefit or relief in the contingency or event
of sickness, accident, hurt or death of any person, shall
be exempt from execution or seizure in satisfaction
of debt or claim upon any judgment in any civil pro-
ceedings, except on judgments for breach of promise
to marry or for seduction."
Research reveals only one decision of the Court of Ap-
peals in which Article 3, Section 44, of the Constitution
has been considered. That is the case of Himmel v. Eichen-
green.5
4
In this case plaintiff, a creditor, had a writ of attach-
ment against a non-resident defendant-debtor, laid in the
hands of the Supreme Conclave Improved Order of Hepta-
sophs, a fraternal beneficial association, as garnishee.
Action of assumpsit was brought against defendant-debtor.
The writ sought to attach $250 due the defendant-debtor,
as beneficiary of the deceased Eichengreen, who held a
benefit certificate in the association. Both defendant and
garnishee filed a motion to quash the attachment on the
ground that the fund was a benefit and not liable to at-
tachment under Article 23, Section 217, of the then exist-
ing Code.5 Motion to quash was sustained by the lower
court and plaintiff-creditor appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the orders of the lower court.
53Md. Laws 1904, Ch. 381.
,107 Md. 610, 79 A. 915 (1908).
"Md. Code (1904) Art. 23, Sec. 217: "The money or other benefit,
charity, relief or aid to be paid, provided or rendered by any association
authorized to do business under Sec. 210 to See. 223 (both inclusive) of
this article, shall not be liable to attachment by trustee, garnishee or other
process and shall not be seized, taken, appropriated or applied by any legal
or equitable process or by operation of law to pay any debt or liability of
a certificate holder or of any beneficiary named in a certificate, or of any
person who may have any right thereunder."
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One of the questions to be determined by the Court
was whether or not the enactment of Article 23, Section
217 was a valid exercise of legislative power, under the
Maryland Constitution. The contention of the creditor was
that this statute was in conflict with Article 3, Section 44,
of the Constitution authorizing the General Assembly to
protect from execution a reasonable amount of the prop-
erty of the debtor not exceeding in value the sum of $500.
On this point the Court, speaking through Judge Briscoe,
said:
"There is no force in the second objection to the
Act, that it violates the provisions of Article 3, Section
44, of the Constitution, relating to the exemption from
execution of the property of the debtor, not exceeding
the sum of five hundred dollars.
"There can be no reason for the assertion of this
objection in the case at bar because if available, the
amount in question does not exceed the sum of five
hundred dollars.
"The limitation however prescribed by the Consti-
tution under Article 3, Section 44, clearly relates to
the exemption of property from execution and is not
applicable to cases of exemption from attachment, of
'money or other benefits' payable under a certificate
issued by a fraternal association, as in this case. In
Dale v. Brumbly, 96 Md. 674, the amount involved
under the certificate was $3,000. We there said: 'The
Act of 1894, Ch. 295, which was in force at the date of
the last named assignment, declares that such associa-
tions are organized and carried on for the sole benefit
of its members and their beneficiaries and not for
profit. It also provides that the fund or benefit shall
not be liable to be applied by any legal process or by
operation of law to pay any debt or liability of a cer-
tificate holder,' &c., &c.
"The association would have no power then under
its constitution or the laws of the State to pay the fund
to a creditor of the deceased.
"In Coward v. Dillinger, 56 Md. 59, it is said: All
property within the limits of the State, whether owned
by residents or non-residents, is subject to its laws,
1942]
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and the State has the right to prescribe how and in
what manner such property shall be subjected to the
claims of creditors. It is upon this principle that
attachment laws are founded.
"We think that an attachment is not such an exe-
cution as was intended, to be affected by the constitu-
tional provision here relied on." (Italics supplied.)
The writer has taken the liberty of quoting rather ex-
tensively above for a number of reasons:
(1) All of this part of the opinion may be said to be
dictum as only $250 was involved. If dictum, it is never-
theless submitted that it is all that we have from the Court
of Appeals construing this particular constitutional pro-
vision. If, however, we consider the creditor's attack on
the statute to be total because it gives out and out exemp-
tion without regard to limitation of amount, which appears
to be actually the situation, it would seem that the con-
struing of the constitutionality of this statute was essential
to the decision in the case, and that the quoted language
should not be considered as mere dictum.
(2) While the particular facts in this case involved a
certificate of a beneficial association not run for profit, this
should not seem to be the decisive factor. It is difficult to
see why that would permit the legislature to exempt the
fund (which is the debtor's property) if the Constitution
says "nay". The important factor would seem to be that
there is no constitutional limitation on the legislature to
exempt a debtor's property from attachment-as distin-
guished from execution.
(3) The Court of Appeals has, in deciding this case,
made a distinction between attachment and execution and,
by so doing, thereby has put a restrictive meaning on the
word "execution", in Article 3, Section 44 of the Constitu-
tion. In other words, "execution" as used in the Constitu-
tion does not mean seizure of a debtor's property by any
type of process provided by law, but it is limited to some
special type of process or processes. What, then, is meant
by "execution"?
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There were four writs of execution known to the com-
mon law for the enforcement of a money judgment, as
distinct from a judgment in a possessory action:5 6
1. Capias ad satisfaciendum (ca. sa.), which was a
writ for the seizure of the debtor's person. This obviously
is not pertinent, and would be of little value in any event,
because of the Maryland Constitutional provision: "No
person shall be imprisoned for debt."57
2. Levari facias (lev. fa.). This writ has been little
used in the United States and apparently is not known in
Maryland."
3. Elegit. This is not authorized in the United States
except in Florida and Delaware.59 It is not used in Mary-
land.6 0
4. Fieri facias (fi. fa.). This writ is, of course, in use
in Maryland.
By a process of elimination, it can be concluded that
execution in Maryland for the enforcement of a money
judgment can only be one thing, namely, the writ of fieri
facias. Therefore, when the Constitution in Article 3, Sec-
tion 44 uses the word "execution", it contemplates only
the use of the writ of fieri facias.
And, as said above, in the absence of statute, the writ
of fieri facias can only reach tangible property. It cannot
reach an intangible such as a chose in action.
In connection with this distinction it is perhaps of value
to note that many of our statutes speak of execution or at-
tachment,6 ' and execution or seizure.2  If "execution" is
taken in the broad sense of any type of legal remedy for
subjecting a person's property to the satisfaction of a cred-
itor's claim or judgment it would seem unnecessary sur-
:1 GiENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) 25.
7 Md. Const. (1867) Art. 3, Sec. 38.
58 FREEMAN, EXECUTIONS (1882) Sec. 370.
50 Ibid.60 POE, PRACIcE (Tiffany 1925 Ed.) Sec. 627.
61 Md. Code (1939) Art. 70, Sec. 13, Old Age Assistance; Md. Code (1939)
Art. 101, Sec. 64, Workmen's Compensation; Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec.
176, Cemetery lots; Md. Code (1939) Art. 95A, Sec. 15(c), Unemployment
Compensation; Rules of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, Rule 9A of
the Common Law Courts.
61 Md. Code (1939) Art. 83, Sec. .
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plusage for the Legislature, when it used the term "execu-
tion", to add any further term, such as attachment.
In insisting on the above distinction, the writer is not
unmindful of the fact that an attachment on judgment, as
distinguished from attachment on original process, is said
to be an execution. Quoting from Poe on Practice:
"The process itself is treated by the Acts of As-
sembly on the subject, beginning with the original Act
of 1715, as an execution; and our Court of Appeals
have declared that its office is the same as that of a
fieri facias, and that it must be governed by the same
principles and rules."6
But even the attachment on judgment requires the aid
of the fieri facias effectively to consummate it. Following
the above quoted sentence, Poe says:
"This general language, while undoubtedly correct
in a certain sense, is still not strictly accurate, and
unless explained, is calculated to mislead ... Accord-
ingly, while an attachment upon judgment is an ex-
ecution, it is not final process in all respects like a
fi. fa., under which the sheriff proceeds to seize and
sell; but while it is final process against the defendant,
it is also, at the same time, rather in the nature of an
interlocutory proceeding, designed as the beginning of
a process either in rem or personam, under which a
final judgment of condemnation may be obtained, and
when obtained, may be enforced by the effective writ
of fieri facias. In other words, while it has some of
the attributes of an execution, it has, at the same time,
especially against the garnishee, many qualities of
mesne process . . ."0'
The above is quoted because, while the general state-
ment that attachment on judgment is treated as an execu-
tion may, at first blush, appear to destroy the distinction
between execution and attachment on judgment, in reality
such a statement emphasizes the distinction. If they are
the same, why say it is treated like an execution and, as
e8POE, PRACTICE (Tiffany Ed. 1925) See. 690.
6 Ibid.
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Poe points out, in reality the fi. fa. is a necessary supple-
ment to the writ of attachment. In this connection it is to be
noted that the statute authorizing attachment on judgment
says: "In all judgments . . .an execution or attachment
may issue...,, If they are one and the same, this would
not seem to be necessary.
Furthermore, it does not seem reasonable to say that
the Constitutional limitation on what property is to be
exempt, and how much, is to turn on the question of
whether or not the creditor has obtained a judgment; that
choses in action of the type under discussion are fully
exempt from attachment on original process, but if the
creditor has obtained a judgment, and then has issued an
attachment on judgment, the constitutional limitation ap-
plies and choses in action of the type under discussion are
then only exempt up to $500. It would hardly seem to be
the function of the Constitution to concern itself with
making a mere procedural question be the decisive test
for permitting the exemption of property. It would seem
far more likely that what the framers of the Constitution
had in mind was to provide for the kind and amount of
property that could be exempted, and that they of purpose,
by the use of the word "execution", refused to place any
restriction on the legislature's power to exempt property
not reachable by execution, such as choses in action. The
possibility of creditors seeking to subject such things as
pensions66 to the satisfaction of their claims could well
have been in the minds of the framers. And, by the same
token, the protection of one's family through the device
of insurance could well be considered an end socially to
be desired. Free rein should be given to the legislative
branch of the government so that it might adequately pro-
tect this property from creditors free from constitutional
restraint. If the legislature were restricted by the Consti-
tution in its power to exempt only as to tangible property,
:'Md. Code (1939) Art. 26, Sec. 21.
00 Old Age Pensions, Md. Code (1939) Art. 70A, Sec. 13; Unemployment
Compensation, Md. Code (1939) Art. 95A, Sec. 15(c); Workmen's Com-
pensation, Md. Code (1939) Art. 101, Sec. 64; State Employee's Retirement
Fund, Md. Laws, 1941, Ch. 377, adding Md. Code (1939) Art. 73B, Sec. 11.
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and left unrestricted as to intangibles, such as choses in
action, this result could be achieved.
If the preceding analysis of the word "execution" in
the Constitution is proper, and the writer believes it is,
then it would seem that the District Court's decision in
In re Jones" permitting a bankrupt to exempt only $500
of his insurance is not sound, and that the bankrupt should
be granted total exemption as to his insurance policy or
its cash surrender value.
Let us next consider briefly three subsequent bank-
ruptcy opinions.
In re Cooper's Estate,6" is of interest because the bank-
ruptcy court differed with its previous decision in the
Jones case as to the amount of the exemption. In the
Cooper case the Court decided that the cash surrender
value was not "money payable in the nature of insurance"
nor upon the contingency of death, but that nevertheless
it was property and that the bankrupt was entitled to $100
exemption (not $500) under the first clause of Article 83,
Section 8.69
This problem was again before the District Court for
Maryland when the bankrupt had certain policies whereby
his life was insured for the benefit of his wife. The right
to change the beneficiary was reserved, but it had not been
exercised at the time of bankruptcy.. The policies had a
cash surrender value of $836.25. The bankrupt claimed a
$500 exemption, the trustee contended the bankrupt was
only entitled to $100. The District Court allowed a $500
exemption. No opinion was reported. An appeal was
taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals in Hickman v. Han-
over.70 This Court affirmed the lower court in allowing
$500 exemption. In the opinion the Court said:
"In the argument here, it was conceded by both
sides that the second clause of the statute7' exempting
"money payable in the nature of insurance", etc., must
S249 F. 487 (D. C. D. Md., 1917).
"28 F. (2d) 438 (D. C. D. Md., 1928).
"See 8upra, circa notes 50 to 53.
To 33 F. (2d) 873 (D. C. D. Md., 1920).
71 Md. Code (1939) Art. 83, Sec. 8.
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be deemed limited by the constitutional provision, and
therefore in no event can an exemption under that
clause exceed $500. It was also conceded that if the
exemption cannot be sustained under that clause, the
cash surrender value is nevertheless a species of prop-
erty, and the bankrupt would be entitled to an exemp-
tion of $100 under the first clause of the statute".
It is to be noted that the only question before the Court
was the exemption of either $100 or $500, and not the ques-
tion of total exemption. Hence the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals did not pass on the question of whether or not a
bankrupt is entitled to a total exemption.
In discussing the proposition that the cash surrender
value is not "money payable in the nature of insurance"
the opinion said:
"But we think this is too narrow and too literal a
construction of the Maryland statute. While there are
a few cases which hold that exemption statutes should
be strictly construed, the better and almost universal
rule is that such statutes should receive a liberal con-
struction in favor of the debtor in order to advance
the humane purpose of preserving to the unfortunate
or improvident debtor or his family the means of ob-
taining a livelihood and prevent them from becoming
a charge upon the public . . .
"We think the plain purpose of the statute was to
encourage men to insure their lives for the benefit of
their families. The legislature evidently attached
more importance to the exemption of insurance than
to the exemption of other property, for in the latter
case it was limited to the small sum of $100. The
cash surrender value is certainly within the spirit of
the statute, and we do not think that we put any strain
upon the statute by holding that it is within its terms.
Nowadays, nearly all, and possibly all, life policies
have a cash surrender value clause. The cash surren-
der value is an ordinary incident to these policies. That
value arises as much from the policy as the money
payable upon the contingency provided for in the pol-
icy. These matters must have been well-known to
the Legislature, and it is not likely that they intended
that such policies should be exempt only upon the
1942]
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actual happening of the contingency mentioned. Our
view is that although the cash surrender value might
not be strictly and technically money from insurance,
because not payable upon the contingency mentioned,
nevertheless, it is in the nature of insurance, and it
is an incident of the policy of insurance, and money
payable in the nature of insurance as would be the
proceeds of the policy when finally collected upon the
death of the insured . . ."
Would it seem unreasonable to maintain that the same
arguments of policy attributed to the Legislature in the
above opinion could likewise be attributed to the framers
of the Constitution, that they of purpose left the Legisla-
ture untrammelled in its power to grant total exemption
of choses in action?
Finally, to complete the record of opinions on this sub-
ject, in In re Beachley7 2 not the insured but an assignee
of a policy went into bankruptcy. He was not related in
any manner to the insured. The Bankruptcy Court said:
"'Money payable in the nature of insurance, benefit
or relief in the contingency or event of sickness, acci-
dent, hurt or death of any person,' (italics inserted)
as the phrase is used in Article 83, Section 8 of the
Maryland Code, above quoted, means when construed
with relation to the section of the Bankruptcy Act
above quoted,7 3 money arising from insurance written
upon the life of a bankrupt, as distinguished from in-
surance upon some one else's life to which the bank-
rupt has acquired a right, as in the present case, by as-
signment."
It was held that the policy belonged to the trustee and
not to the bankrupt and that it was proper for the trustee
to sell it for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors. The
Court did in this case, however, permit the bankrupt to
exempt $100, not as insurance money, but as "property".
The effect of this decision would seem to be that any
policies held by the bankrupt, in which he is not the
assured, and that have a realizable value, pass to the
71 19 F. Supp. 104 (D. C. D. Md., 1937).
1Sec. 70A(3) ; 11 U. S. C. A. 110A(3). See supra, n. 7.
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trustee as property and are not treated as insurance. This
result may seem proper where the bankrupt is a stranger
to the insured as in the instant case, but if the owner of
the policy is the wife of the bankrupt it seems the result
might be questionable.
In conclusion, at the present time the bankruptcy court
holds that if the insurance held by the bankrupt is on the
life of one other than the bankrupt it is treated as property
and not as insurance and may be protected only to the
extent of $100. If the bankrupt is the insured, and re-
serves the right to change the beneficiary and the policy
has a cash surrender value, the bankrupt may keep the
policy by paying to the trustee the cash surrender value
at the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy less
$500; or if the bankrupt fails to do this, the trustee is en-
titled to the policy but the bankrupt may be entitled to
$500 from its proceeds. It is the writer's opinion that this
latter rule in bankruptcy is based upon a misconception
of the Constitutional limitation on the Legislature's power
to exempt property and that the bankrupt when he is the
insured should be granted a complete exemption as to all
money payable in the nature of insurance by virtue of
Maryland statute.
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